Introduction
In one of the earliest attempts to examine the effect of a priori voting power on actual political phenomena, Riker (1959) looked at changes in party affiliation in the French National Assembly in 1953-54, and used these data to test the hypothesis that deputies who switched parties were seeking thereby to increase their a priori voting power. His findings were negative, or at best inconclusive.
In his paper Riker used the voting power index proposed by Shapley and Shubik (1954) -which was the only measure of a priori voting power known to him at that time.
1 By now there is a large body of literature applying considerations of a priori voting power to political institutions such as the UN, the US Congress, the US Presidential Electoral College, the US Supreme Court and its rulings on the implementation of the 'Equal Protection' clause in the 14th Amendment to the Constitution; and of course numerous writings on voting-power considerations in the European Union. But, as far as we know, it took 36 years after Riker's paper was published before someone has followed Riker's lead in suggesting that the formation (or dissolution) of political coalitions should be examined from the viewpoint of a priori voting power, and using for this purpose the Shapley-Shubik (S-S) index. (Shapley, 1953; Shapley and Shubik, 1954) as an algorithm for predicting which governmental coalition is likely to form. Here are some relevant excerpts from this interview (cf. van Damme, 1997: 11-13; van Damme 1998: 184-87) :
Q: From these examples, can one draw some lessons about the type of situations in which one can expect game theory to work in applications?
A: What one needs for game theory to work, in the sense of making verifiable (and falsifiable!) predictions, is that the situation be structured. … For years I have been predicting the government that will form in Israel once the composition of the Israeli parliament is known after an election. That is a structured situation, with set rules. The parliament has 120 seats. Each party gets a number of seats in proportion to the votes it got in the election. To form a government a coalition of 61 members of parliament is required. The president starts by choosing someone to initiate the coalition formation process. (Usually, but not necessarily, this 'leader' is the representative of the largest party in parliament.) The important point is that the process of government formation is a structured situation to which you can apply a theory. … For instance, in the governmental majority matter, one can set up a parliament as a simple game in the sense of Von Neumann and Morgenstern's cooperative game theory, where we model the party as a player; we get a coalitional worth function that attributes to a coalition the worth 1 when it has a majority and the worth 0 otherwise. And then one can work out what the Shapley values are; 3 the structure is there, it is clear, and one can make predictions. Now there are all kinds of things that are ignored by this kind of procedure, but one can go out and make predictions. Then, if the predictions turn out correct, you know that you were right to ignore what you ignored. … Q: In this example of coalition formation, you make predictions using an algorithm that involves the Shapley value. Suppose you show me the data and your prediction comes out correct. I might respond by saying that I don't understand what is going on. Why does it work? Why is the Shapley value related to coalition formation? Is it by accident or is it your intuition, or is it suggested by theory?
A: There are two answers to that. First, certainly this is an intuition that arises from able in this context. However, they agreed that for the purpose of testing Aumann's hypothesis the employment of the S-S index was probably more suitable than using the Penrose measure. See footnote 4.
